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FAMILY LAW-FEDERAL COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE
PROVISIONS OF PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT*
Flood v. Braaten (1984)
Parental kidnapping or "child snatching" is an increasingly com-
mon phenomenon in the United States today.1 Current unofficial esti-
mates suggest that as more and more marriages and families are
dissolving,2 between 50,000 to 100,000 children are being kidnapped by
one or the other of their parents each year.
3
Until the recent enactment of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act (PKPA) in 1980,4 the legal system, in the area of domestic relations
law, actually encouraged parents to engage in child abduction. 5 In par-
* The author wishes to express her appreciation and gratitude to Jean R.
Sternlight for her invaluable assistance and helpful comments.
1. See Agopian & Anderson, Legislative Reforms to Reduce Parental Child Abduc-
tions, 6 J. Juv. L. 1, 2 n.4 (1982) (citing Child Snatching on Increase Across U.S., L.A.
Times, May 25, 1980, West Side Ed. at 1, col. 1)). See generally S. ABRAHMS,
CHILDREN IN THE CROSSFIRE: THE TRAGEDY OF PARENTAL KIDNAPPING (1983); M.
AGOPIAN, PARENTAL CHILD STEALING (198 1). Parental stealing or kidnapping oc-
curs when one parent abducts or detains a child from the other parent in viola-
tion of a custody decree. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1979: Addendum to
Joint Hearing on S. 105 Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Child
and Human Development of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1980) (paper by Michael Agopian, Instructor of Sociology,
West Los Angeles College) [hereinafter cited as Addendum to Joint Hearing].
Although the literature on parental abduction of children frequently refers to
this conduct as "kidnapping," strictly speaking, a parent who seizes his or her
child in violation of a custody decree is not guilty of "kidnapping" under the
criminal laws as defined by most states. See generally S. ABRAHMS, supra; M.
AGOPIAN, supra.
2. See Agopian & Anderson, supra note 1, at 1 n.1. Statistics cited by
Agopian and Anderson indicate that "[i]n 1979, 1,181,000 divorces were
granted in the United States, the highest national divorce total ever observed.
The 1979 figure was 4.5% above that for the preceding year (1,130,000) and
nearly 3 times the number reported 20 years ago (395,000 in 1959)." Id. (quot-
ing National Center for Health Statistics, 30 MONTHLY VIT. STATISTIcs REP. 1, 2
(May 29, 1981)). The increase in the divorce rate has been accompanied by a
dramatic increase in the number of children involved in broken marriages. See
id. at 2 n.3 (quoting National Center for Health Statistics, 30 MONTHLY VIT. STA-
TISTICS REP. 1, 2 (May 29, 1981)). Over 1,100,000 children under the age of 18
were estimated to be involved in divorce actions in 1979. Id. This figure repre-
sents more than twice the number of children in divorce actions in 1957. Id.
3. Friedman & Taus, Kidnapping Your Child, TRIAL, Oct. 1984, at 46-48. See
also Addendum to Joint Hearing, supra note 1, at 63.
4. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-
10, 94 Stat. 3568 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982)) [hereinafter
cited as PKPA].
5. See Lansing & Sherman, The Legal Response to Child Snatching, 7 J. Juv. L.
16, 16 (1983). See also Friedman & Taus, supra note 3, at 47-48 (discussing strat-
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ticular, faced with state court jurisdictional rules which permitted one
state to modify custody decrees of sister states or even make de novo
custody determinations, 6 a parent not awarded custody in the child's
home state was encouraged to kidnap his or her child and flee to a new
jurisdiction in hopes of either gaining custody or having the original
custody decree modified under the laws of the new jurisdiction. 7
Seeking to alleviate problems such as child snatching caused by the
often inconsistent and conflicting practices of state courts in custody dis-
putes, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws promulgated the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)
in 1968.8 However, because the UCCJA had to be adopted by a particu-
egy of noncustodial parent for gaining custody in second jurisdiction after hav-
ing kidnapped his or her child). See generally Agopian & Anderson, supra note 1.
6. See Lansing & Sherman, supra note 5, at 16. Generally, in early domestic
relations law, a state had jurisdiction in child custody cases if the child was domi-
ciled in the state, i.e., "the state was the child's ... 'true, fixed, permanent
home.' " Id. (citing 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws § 9.5 (1935) (citation omitted)).
Throughout the years alternate bases for initial jurisdiction came to be readily
accepted by the states. Id. In addition to assuming jurisdiction based on domi-
cile, state courts assumed jurisdiction when an abducted child was physically
present in a state or when the state had jurisdiction over both parents. d.
Therefore, "two courts could legally have jurisdiction over the same case as a
child could be domiciled in one state yet be physically present in another." Id.
(citing Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948)).
7. See, e.g., Bergen v. Bergen, 439 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1971). A court may
readily assume jurisdiction over a custody dispute already ruled upon by another
court for a number of reasons. First, a court may not trust or agree with a prior
court's custody determination. Agopian & Anderson, supra note 1, at 5. Second,
a court may want to examine for itself custodial circumstances to determine the
"best interests" of the child. See Lansing & Sherman, supra note 5, at 17. For a
discussion of the "best interests" standard, see generally Note, Child Custody:
Determining the Best Interests of the Child, 7J. Juv. L. 135 (1983). Third, courts may
tend to favor the parent who is a resident and is present with the child, even if
the child was abducted. See Agopian & Anderson, supra note 1, at 5-7. Competi-
tion between courts may cause a judge to disregard the judgment of a court in a
sister state and encourage forum shopping on behalf of the parent not awarded
custody in the original jurisdiction. See id. Although some courts are unwilling
to extend jurisdiction to a parent who is a wrongdoer, most courts are not reluc-
tant, rationalizing that a child's "best interests" should not suffer because of the
wrongdoing of the parent. See Lansing & Sherman, supra note 5, at 17.
8. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, §§ 1-27, 9 U.L.A. 116, 114
prefatory note (1968) [hereinafter cited as UCCJA]. Under the UCCJA, a court
may exercise jurisdiction over a child custody action if: (1) it is situated in the
same state as the child's home; (2) the child and at least one parent have a signif-
icant connection with the state and substantial evidence of the child's care exists
there; (3) the child has been abandoned or has been exposed to or threatened
with neglect, abuse or mistreatment in the forum state; or (4) no other state
satisfies the UCCJA jurisdictional requirements or a state satisfying the prerequi-
sites declines to exercise jurisdiction because the forum state is a more appropri-
ate forum to decide the custody issue and the child's best interests require that
the forum state exercise jurisdiction. Id. at §§ 3, 8, 13-15, 9 U.L.A. at 122-23,
142, 151-58. See Wand, A Call for the Repudiation of the Domestic Relations Exception
to Federal Jurisdiction, 30 VILL. L. REV. 307, 360, 388-91 (1985) (discussing judi-
cially created problem of child-snatching and effectiveness of two statutory at-
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lar state in order to be enforceable in that state, and because not all
states chose to adopt the UCCJA,9 jurisdictional problems in custody
disputes still remained.
Accordingly, in 1980 Congress passed the Parental Kidnapping Pre-
vention Act (PKPA) l0 in a direct attempt to remedy jurisdictional con-
flicts and competition between states in the determination of child
custody actions. I I The Act attempts to prevent jurisdictional conflicts
by requiring all states to respect the custody decrees of a sister state. In
particular, the PKPA establishes strict criteria for the modification of
custody decrees by a court of another state. It provides:
A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of
the same child made by a court of another State, if
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody deter-
mination; and (2) the court of the other State no longer
has jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such jurisdic-
tion to modify such determination.12
Because the federal courts have traditionally abstained from in-
tempts-the PKPA and the UCCJA-to resolve epidemic problem); Note, The
Search for a Solution to Child Snatching, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1073 (1983) (same).
The UCCJA, like the PKPA, was designed to avoid state court jurisdictional
conflicts; to promote cooperation with other state courts so that a child custody
decree would be rendered by the state most competent to determine the child's
"best interests"; to avoid relitigation of custody decrees; to facilitate the en-
forcement of custody decrees of sister states; and to deter abductions of children
to gain custody. See Wand, supra, at 311 n. 11 (citing Freed & Foster, Family Law
in the Fifty States: An Overview, 17 FAM. L.Q. 365, 409-10 (1983)).
9. Initially states manifested a reluctance to adopt the UCCJA. Only 26 had
adopted the Act by 1978. Lansing & Sherman, supra note 5, at 19 n.30. Today,
however, the UCCJA has been adopted by all 50 jurisdictions. See 9 U.L.A. supp.
at 22-23 (Supp. 1985) (table ofjurisdictions wherein UCCJA has been adopted).
10. PKPA, Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 94 Stat. 3568 (1980) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1738A (1982)). The PKPA was passed in an attempt to rectify some
failings of the UCCJA. See Agopian & Anderson, supra note 1, at 17-19.
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982). Congress passed the PKPA to "avoidjurisdictional competition and conflict between State courts in matters of child
custody and visitation which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children
from State to State with harmful effects on their well being." See 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1738A note (West Supp. 1984).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f) (1982). The PKPA also modified the Federal Par-
ent Locator Service (FPLS), a computerized information system previously used
only to locate parents who were delinquent in their child support payments, ex-
panding that program to assist in finding abducted children and absconding par-
ents as well. See PKPA, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 9, 94 Stat. 3568 (1980). The FPLS
provisions are codified at 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1982). In addition, the PKPA broad-
ened the application of the Fugitive Felon Act so it would cover child abduction
cases that involved the interstate or international flight of a parent. See PKPA,
Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 10, 94 Stat. 3568 (1980). The Fugitive Felon Act is codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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volvement in child custody disputes13 by invoking the "domestic rela-
tions" 14 and "full faith and credit"' 5 exceptions to federal jurisdiction,
the responsibility of interpreting the provisions of the PKPA has gener-
ally fallen to state rather than federal courts. 16 However, in Flood v.
Braaten,17 the Third Circuit challenged this traditional stance, holding
that, based upon Congress' intent, federal courts may exercise jurisdic-
tion to enforce compliance with the provisions of the PKPA.18
The Flood case arose following Betty Braaten Flood's divorce from
Gerald Braaten in July, 1977.19 The original divorce decree, issued in
13. See, e.g., Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1975); Albanese
v. Richter, 161 F.2d 688 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 782 (1947).
14. See 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3609 (1984). The domestic relations exception to federal jurisdic-
tion is not premised upon any statutory language, but instead stems from
Supreme Court dicta. See Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1021-22 (3d Cir.
1975). In one of the earliest decisions commenting on the domestic relations
exception, the Supreme Court stated: "We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction
in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce or for the allow-
ance of alimony .... " Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1859). See also In re
Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) ("whole subject of the domestic relation of
husband and wife, parent and child," properly rests with states). The domestic
relations exception has also been applied in the area of child custody. See, e.g.,
Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782 (3d Cir. 1972) (civil rights action
brought by children regarding adjudication of their own custody rights); Hem-
stadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1967) (declaratory judgment action
brought by father to construe custody and visitation rights); Albanese v. Richter,
161 F.2d 688 (3d Cir.) (suit by illegitimate child against putative father for sup-
port payments), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 782 (1947).
The Supreme Court, however, has recently moved away from total absten-
tion in domestic relations issues. See infra text accompanying notes 59-66. For
an in-depth discussion of the domestic relations exception, see generally Wand,
supra note 8. See also infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer,
356 U.S. 604, 607 (1958). The Constitution's full faith and credit clause re-
quires that ajudgment that is final and therefore resjudicata in the courts of one
state must ordinarily be given full faith and credit by all other courts in the
United States. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). How-
ever, federal courts have specifically declined to grant full faith and credit to
child custody decrees because custody decisions are always subject to modifica-
tion and thus lack finality. For a discussion of the modifiability of custody de-
crees, see infra note 44. The federal courts' refusal to apply full faith and credit
to prior custody decrees has traditionally been viewed as creating a bar to fed-
eral jurisdiction over custody disputes. See, e.g., Flood, 727 F.2d at 309 n.19. For
a further discussion of the full faith and credit exception, see infra note 44.
16. See Note,Jurisdiction And The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act Of 1980, 7
J. Juv. L. 160, 160 (1983). For examples of state court decisions involving ques-
tions ofjurisdiction under the PKPA, see Wood v. Graham, 633 S.W.2d 404 (Ky.
1982); Pierce v. Pierce, - Mont. -, 640 P.2d 899 (1982); Tufares v. Wright, 98
N.M. 8, 644 P.2d 522 (1982); Belosky v. Belosky, 97 N.M. 365, 640 P.2d 471
(1982); State ex rel. Valles v. Brown, 97 N.M. 327, 639 P.2d 1181 (1981).
17. 727 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1984).
18. Id. at 305-07. For a discussion of the court's holding, see infra notes 57-
58 and accompanying text.
19. 727 F.2d at 305.
1985] 1013
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North Dakota, awarded custody of Flood and Braaten's children to
Flood. 20 However, two years later the parties amended the decree to
permit Flood to leave North Dakota with the children and to give
Braaten the right to custody of the children during the summer months
of each year. 2 1 Shortly after this modification, Flood and the children
moved out of state. 22 When they returned to North Dakota for a visit
with relatives during the 1979 Thanksgiving holiday, a lengthy and com-
plicated custody battle involving both the New Jersey and North Dakota
courts commenced. 23
On December 4, 1979, Braaten obtained an ex parte order from a
North Dakota court awarding him custody of the children. 24 Although
Flood had the order rescinded soon thereafter, 25 Braaten obtained an-
other order from a North Dakota court, on August 6, 1980, mandating
that custody of the four children be transferred to him.26 Four days
later, Braaten seized two of the children, Joel and Shawna, in New Jersey
and took them to North Dakota.27 Flood responded by first filing a com-
plaint with the New Jersey Superior Court seeking custody of all four
children and then filing a motion with the North Dakota court request-
ing that its custody decree be modified to return custody of the children
to her.2 8 The same day she filed the motion with the North Dakota
court, Flood seized Joel from Braaten and returned to New Jersey.29
Finally, after eleven more months of legal battling between the parties,
the New Jersey Superior Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to modify
20. Id. The parties had four minor children: Jim, Jason, Joel, and Shawna.
Id.
21. Id. Both parties agreed to amend the custody arrangement on August
24, 1979. Id.
22. Id. Flood and the children first moved to New York where they resided
temporarily before ultimately moving to New Jersey. Id.
23. By the time the battle finally reached the federal courts, three years had
passed. See id. at 305-06.
24. Id.
25. Id. Flood had the ex parte order rescinded December 10, 1979, and
immediately Peturned to New York with the four children. Id. Within the next
few weeks, Flood and the four children moved to New Jersey. Id.
26. Id. A North Dakota district court ordered Flood to show cause why cus-
tody of the children should not be awarded to Braaten. Id. The show cause
order was first issued on January 15, 1980, but because it was not timely served,
a new order was issued by the court on February 28, 1980. Id. at 305 n.5. Cus-
tody of the four children was transferred to Braaten over the objection of
Flood's lawyer who had made a limited appearance. Id. at 305.
27. Id. New Jersey criminal charges based on this abduction were filed
against both Braaten and his new wife, Karen, however the charges were later
dismissed. Id. at 305 n.7.
28. Id. at 305.
29. Id. Flood attempted to abduct both Joel and Shawna. Although she
was successful in removing Joel from North Dakota, her attempt to regain
Shawna failed. Id.
1014 [Vol. 30: p. 1010
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the custody decree and resolve the dispute under the UCCJA.3 0
Braaten's attempt to have the North Dakota custody decree enforced
was denied by several NewJersey courts.3 ' On March 15, 1982, the Su-
perior Court of New Jersey awarded custody of the children to Flood.3 2
By the fall of 1982, Flood and Braaten's custody battle was at an
impasse, with the courts of New Jersey and North Dakota each refusing
to enforce the custody decree of the other court.3 3 In an attempt to end
the deadlock, Flood filed a complaint with the United States District
Court for the District of NewJersey, requesting a stay of all further state
judicial proceedings, and a federal court order enforcing the New Jersey
custody decree.3 4 The district court, sua sponte, summarily dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a basis of jurisdiction. 3 5 Flood appealed
the district court's dismissal to the Third Circuit.3 6
Writing for a unanimous court,3 7 Judge Adams faced the issue of
whether the PKPA affords federal question jurisdiction for the enforce-
ment of its provisions. 38 The court began its analysis by considering
30. Id. at 305 n.8 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:34-28 (West Supp. 1981)).
For a discussion of the UCCJA, see supra note 8.
31. 727 F.2d at 305-06. Braaten's attempt to have the North Dakota cus-
tody decree enforced was denied when the New Jersey Superior Court ruled that
NewJersey was the proper forum to resolve the custody dispute. Id. at 305. The
New Jersey opinion presented four reasons why the court should exercise juris-
diction over the custody decree for the Braaten children: (1) the children had
lived in NewJersey just three days short of the required six months to make it a
"homestate"; (2) North Dakota had not been the children's "homestate" within
the past six months; (3) the North Dakota court had awarded custody to Braaten
without any consideration of the pending New Jersey action; and (4) considera-
tion of the custody decree by a NewJersey court would serve the "best interests"
of the children. Id. at 306 n.9. Braaten was denied leave to appeal the superior
court ruling by both the Appellate Division and the Supreme Court of New
Jersey. Id. at 306.
32. Id. After Flood was awarded custody of the children by the NewJersey
Superior Court, she traveled to North Dakota in a second unsuccessful attempt
to abduct Shawna, the single child still remaining with Braaten. Id.
33. Id. Each state asserted jurisdiction over the matter and awarded cus-
tody to the parent residing in the forum state. Id.
34. Id. The complaint that was filed on November 29, 1982, alleged that
federal jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, "the provision codifying
the PKPA's rules for state court adjudication of custody cases." Id. For a discus-
sion of the PKPA, see supra note 11.
35. 727 F.2d at 306. District Judge Ackerman dismissed the complaint
without prejudice the same day it was filed. Id.
36. Id.
37. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Adams and Higginbotham and
District Judge Teitelbaum of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. See id. at 304.
38. Id. at 306-07. The court, emphasizing the narrowness of the question
presented for review, stated:
The issue before us is not whether federal courts can enter child cus-
tody decrees or even whether federal courts should be generally avail-
able for interstate enforcement of custody decrees. Rather, we
understand the question on this appeal to be considerably more nar-
1985] 1015
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss3/15
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
whether the doctrines which traditionally had precluded federal court
jurisdiction over child custody matters-the domestic relations excep-
tion 39 and the full faith and credit exception 4°-also foreclosed a fed-
eral court from exercising its power to enforce compliance with the
PKPA.4 1
Rejecting the applicability of the domestic relations exception, the
Third Circuit reviewed prior federal court decisions that had invoked
the exception to disclaim federal jurisdiction over actions for divorce,
child custody and other domestic relations matters. 4 2 The court distin-
guished these prior cases on the grounds that the parties in those cases
had based their claim of access to the federal courts on diversity jurisdic-
tion, whereas Flood's complaint, was based on federal question
jurisdiction. 43
Similarly, the court found that the longstanding practice of denying
full faith and credit to custody decrees did not preclude federal jurisdic-
tion for the enforcement of the PKPA.44 Noting the differences between
the general language and directive of the full faith and credit clause and
row: if a State court does not comply with the mandates of [the
PKPAI-whether by asserting jurisdiction over a child custody case in
violation of [the PKPA] or by refusing to enforce another State's cus-
tody decree in violation of [the PKPA]-may a federal court ever be
employed to correct such a violation of federal law?
Id.
39. Id. at 306-08. For a discussion of the domestic relations exception, see
supra note 14, infra note 42 and accompanying text.
40. 727 F.2d at 306-08. For a discussion of the full faith and credit excep-
tion, see supra note 15, infra note 44 and accompanying text.
41. 727 F.2d at 306.
42. Id. at 307. The Third Circuit acknowledged that federal courts have
traditionally declined to assert diversity jurisdiction over "domestic relations"
actions. Id. (citing Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1859) (no jurisdiction in
federal courts in divorce or alimony actions); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d
1018, 1021-26 (3d Cir. 1975) (no federal jurisdiction in divorce, support action);
Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 1972) (no federal jurisdic-
tion in domestic relations case involving child custody)).
43. 727 F.2d at 308. Although the Third Circuit neither attempted to de-
fine the scope of the "amorphous" term, "domestic relations," nor questioned
the general viability of the domestic relations exception, it concluded that "the
domestic relations exception per se applies only to actions in diversity .... We
find no cases declining federal jurisdiction on the basis of the domestic relations
exception when a litigant has otherwise made out a well-pleaded and substantial
complaint alleging federal subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at 307. The court
recognized that while the broad language in some cases suggested that the do-
mestic relations exception also applies to federal question cases, this language is
"simply reflect[ive ofn the fact that until recently neither the Constitution nor
laws of the United States were seen as affecting the family unit." Id. at 307 n. 17
(citing In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 594 (1890); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d
1018, 1024 (3d Cir. 1975); Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 317 (2d Cir.
1967)).
44. Id. at 308-09. Courts of one state generally must give full faith and
credit to the final judgments of another state and their failure to do so may be
challenged in a claim for enforcement of such judgments in federal court under
1016 [Vol. 30: p. 1010
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the specific requirements of the PKPA,4 5 the court pointed out that the
federal courts' reluctance to apply full faith and credit principles to cus-
tody decrees, rooted in the fear that the court would become embroiled
in the underlying dispute, was inapposite. 46 The Third Circuit reasoned
that a court need not become enmeshed in the underlying custody dis-
pute in order to decide a lawsuit based on the PKPA since, under that
statute, a court's task is merely to decide which state court properly as-
serted jurisdiction, not which parent should be awarded custody.4 7
the full faith and credit clause. See id. However, as the Third Circuit stated in
Flood:
[E]ven though the Supreme Court has reserved the question whether
full faith and credit principles apply at all to custody decrees, the
modifiability of custody decrees makes it unlikely that a litigant could
properly allege a federal claim for outright enforcement of a custody
decree under the Full Faith and Credit Clause or statute.
Id. (citations omitted). It is the special character of custody decrees that pre-
vents the true application of full faith and credit principles. See id. (citing Ford v.
Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 194 (1962) (courts of South Carolina are not precluded
from modifying custody decrees of another state by full faith and credit clause);
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) (Ohio court need not give full faith and
credit to Wisconsin custody order); Eicke v. Eicke, 399 So. 2d 1231 (La. App.)
(Louisiana court refused to give full faith and credit to Texas custody decree)
cert. denied, 406 So. 2d 607 (La. 1981), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983)). The
Third Circuit explained that because custody decrees can be modified rather
easily by the rendering state itself if changed circumstances demonstrate that a
modification would be in the "best interests" of the child, full faith and credit
principles may permit modification in some other forum state as well. See 727
F.2d at 309 (citing New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947) (court
in one state can modify custody decrees made in another state)).
Therefore, the Third Circuit concluded that because a federal court asked
to apply full faith and credit to one court's custody decree "would ineluctably be
drawn into readjudicating the underlying custody dispute," such suits could
rarely state a valid federal claim. Id. at 308-09.
45. 727 F.2d at 309-10. In comparing full faith and credit provisions with
PKPA requirements, the Third Circuit emphasized that, unlike the full faith and
credit principles which allow state courts to apply their own standards in deter-
mining when they can assert jurisdiction to modify a custody decree, the PKPA
provides specific rules for determining the one state forum that can take jurisdic-
tion. Id. The court also noted that the PKPA, unlike the full faith and credit
clause, forbids a state court from exercising jurisdiction in any custody proceed-
ing commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in another state court,
where the state court is exercising jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions
of the Act. Id. at 310 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g) (1982)).
46. 727 F.2d at 309. The Third Circuit was not concerned that a federal
court enforcing state compliance with the PKPA "would ineluctably be drawn
into readjudicating the underlying dispute," as would a court considering
whether "changed circumstances" have occurred to warrant modification of the
custody decree. Id.
47. Id. at 310. The PKPA requires only a preliminary inquiry into the facts
to determine which state court appropriately has jurisdiction under the statute.
See id. Because the PKPA permits only one state at a time to assert jurisdiction
(unlike full faith and credit principles) the court concluded that "a federal court
could in certain cases enforce a decree without becoming enmeshed in the un-
derlying custody dispute." Id. But see Wand, supra note 8, at 391-92 n.454.
1985] 1017
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After concluding that the traditional bars to federal jurisdiction in
child custody cases were inapplicable to a suit under the PKPA,4 8 the
court addressed the issue of whether Congress intended to afford fed-
eral court jurisdiction to enforce the PKPA.49 Finding no guidance in
the language of the statute,50 the court examined its legislative his-
tory. 5 1 Upon analyzing various committee reports, statements, and
other testimony, the Third Circuit concluded that whereas Congress in-
tended to leave the rendering and even initial enforcement of custody
determinations themselves in the hands of the state courts, 52 Congress
also intended to permit PKPA enforcement actions to be brought in fed-
eral court. In reaching this conclusion the court focused on the fact that
Congress had sought to enact a uniform set of rules governing custody
jurisdiction that would be binding on all state courts in order to elimi-
nate the incentive to "snatch" children generated by inconsistent state
laws governing custody jurisdiction. 5 3 Explaining that "[t]he Congres-
48. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
49. 727 F.2d at 310.
50. Id. at 310-11. The court observed that the language of the PKPA
neither provides for nor prohibits federal court jurisdiction. Id. at 310.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 310-11 (citing Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1979: Joint Hear-
ing on S. 105 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Senate Judiciary Comm. and
the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the Senate Labor and Resources Comm.,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Joint Hearing] (testimony of
Congressman Duncan) ("[wle hold Federal interference to the minimum"); id. at
71 (testimony of A. Miller, President, Children's Rights, Inc., and supporter of
bill) ("We do not want the Federal Government settling custody disputes.")).
The court also found support for this conclusion in the fact that a House
Committee had rejected an alternative proposal by Congressman Hamilton Fish
that would have overruled the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdic-
tion insofar as it applies to child custody decrees. 727 F.2d at 310 (citing Paren-
tal Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980)). Noting that Con-
gressman Fish's proposal would have permitted parents to enforce custody de-
crees in the federal courts without regard to the usual requirement of a $10,000
amount-in-controversy in diversity cases, the court interpreted the rejection of
this proposal to mean that "Congress wished to prevent the federal district
courts from becoming a forum of first resort when an out-of-state parent disre-
gards a custody decree." Id. at 311.
53. 727 F.2d at 310-11. The Third Circuit explained that the inconsistency
of state laws governing jurisdiction over custody disputes had led parents to
believe that they might secure custody by snatching their children and fleeing to
a different state. Id. at 311. For a discussion of the inconsistency of state juris-
dictional law, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
The court noted that the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)
was drafted in 1968 particularly because of the "chaos" generated by inconsis-
tent state laws. 727 F.2d at 311. The court further indicated, however, that by
the time of the congressional hearings on the PKPA, the interstate custody prob-
lem had little improved from the situation existing when the UCCJA was pro-
posed over a decade earlier. Id. The Third Circuit quoted the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws to describe that situation:
[T]he courts of the various states have acted in isolation and at times in
competition with each other; often with disastrous consequences. A
9
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sional sponsors of [the PKPA] believed that the need for nationwide uni-
formity in the rules of custody jurisdiction justified exercising federal
power to compel interstate cooperation, ' 5 4 the Third Circuit found that
to deny a federal court jurisdiction for the enforcement of the PKPA
would thwart the congressional policy underlying the PKPA and render
its provisions virtually meaningless. 5 5 Writing for the court, Judge Ad-
ams stated: "[W]e cannot believe that Congress intended to render [the
PKPA] virtually nugatory by so restricting the availability of a federal
court of one state may have awarded custody to the mother while an-
other state decreed simultaneously that the child must go to the father
.... In situations like this the litigants do not know which court to
obey. They may face punishment for contempt of court and perhaps
criminal charges for child stealing in one state when complying with the
decree of the other. Also a custody decree made in one state one year
is often overturned in another jurisdiction the next year or some years
later and the child is handed over to another family, to be repeated as
long as the feud continues ....
To remedy this intolerable state of affairs where self-help and the
rule of "seize-and-run" prevail rather than the orderly processes of the
law, uniform legislation has been urged in recent years to bring about a
fair measure of interstate stability in custody awards ....
The Act is designed to bring some semblance of order into the
existing chaos.
Id. (quoting UCCJA, 9 U.L.A. 116, 113-14 prefatory note (1979)).
54. 727 F.2d at 311 (citing Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1979: Hearing
on S. 105 Before the Child and Human Development Subcomm. of the Senate Labor and
Human Resources Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 167 (1979)) [hereinafter cited as
Hearing]. The Third Circuit quoted one of the bill's sponsors, Senator Wallop:
Because the UCCJA is a reciprocal act and may be freely adopted or
rejected by the states, its effectiveness in interstate custody cases de-
pends upon its adoption throughout the country ....
The price of waiting for this eventuality is too high in terms for Con-
gress not to take initiative in finding a solution to the interstate child-
snatching problem.
Id. (citing Hearing, supra, at 15 (statement of Senator Malcolm Wallop)). The
Third Circuit also quoted Senator Cranston:
Although legal custody issues relating to divorce and child-custody
matters have traditionally been within the domain of the States and not
the Federal Government, it is within the province of the Federal Gov-
ernment to resolve problems that are interstate in origin and which the
States, acting independently, seem unable to resolve ....
Id. at 311 n.25 (quotingJoint Hearing, supra note 52, at 4 (statement of Senator
Alan Cranston, co-sponsor)). At the same hearing, Congressman Duncan
stated: "Though I would prefer to have this question addressed at the State
level, it has not been .... [W]e [the federal government] can handle this prob-
lem here." Joint Hearing, supra note 52, at 20 (testimony of Congressman
Duncan).
55. 727 F.2d at 312. Before reaching this conclusion, the court acknowl-
edged that direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court from a state
supreme court which allegedly had violated the PKPA is, in theory, an available
option to the litigant denied a federal forum at a lower level. Id. However, the
court quickly dismissed the feasibility of this option, indicating that the Supreme
Court's crowded docket effectively prevented it from ensuring compliance, on a
case-by-case basis, with the PKPA. Id.
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forum that state compliance with the legislation would become op-
tional." 56 The court thus held that Flood's complaint sufficiently al-
leged a violation of federal statutory rights under the PKPA5 7 and that it
could not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 58
Notwithstanding the refusal of several circuit courts to involve
themselves in child custody disputes even when federal constitutional
questions are at stake,59 recent Supreme Court analyses support the
Third Circuit's conclusion that the domestic relations bar to federal
court jurisdiction applies solely to child custody cases arising in diversity
and not to federal question cases.60 For example, in Palmore v. Sidoli,6 1
the Court granted certiorari to review the judgment of a state court that
had divested a natural mother of custody of her infant child because of
56. 727 F.2d at 312.
57. Id. at 312-13. The Third Circuit noted that Flood had "alleged that
North Dakota and New Jersey courts have concurrently issued conflicting cus-
tody decrees." Id. She also alleged "that she and her children [were] suffering
irreparable harm from the lack of consistent custody decrees." Id. at 313. Given
these allegations, the court concluded that the complaint described a violation
of Flood's rights protected by federal law, the PKPA. Id. Those rights included
"the right to have one state at a time determine her childrens' [sic] custody and
the right to have other states enforce the determination unless modification is
permitted by federal law." Id. (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 312. The court, enunciating the standard promulgated in Bell v.
Hood, concluded that Flood's complaint could not be dismissed because it was
not "wholly insubstantial and frivolous [or] so patently without merit as to jus-
tify . . . dismissal for want of jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678 (1946)).
59. See, e.g., Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 623 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1980) (court
denied jurisdiction where minor's right to remain in United States was in ques-
tion because of custody dispute); Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir.
1978) (court denied jurisdiction in habeas corpus action brought by natural rela-
tives of four Vietnamese children contesting evacuation and custody of children
under "Operation Babylift"). It is submitted that the Third Circuit in Flood inac-
curately stated that there were no cases "declining federal jurisdiction on the
basis of the domestic relations exception . . . [and a] complaint alleging federal
subject matter jurisdiction." 727 F.2d at 307.
For cases where federal courts have accepted jurisdiction over domestic re-
lations controversies involving federal questions, see Nguyen Da Yen v. Kis-
senger, 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975) (babylifted Vietnamese children brought
class action against Immigration and Naturalization Service asserting that their
fifth amendment rights were violated by their continued involuntary detention in
United States in custody of people other than their parents); Abdul-Rahman
Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) (alien, a Lebanese citizen,
sought custody of his daughter from his ex-wife and her American husband). See
also Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir.) (federal court granted
jurisdiction over tort actions for child snatching), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1014
(1982); Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Wis.) (same), aff'd, 694 F.2d
489 (7th Cir. 1982); Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (same).
60. The district and circuit courts are not consistent in their holdings as to
whether the domestic relations bar precludes federal jurisdiction in federal
question cases. See supra note 59.
61. 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984).
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her remarriage to a person of a different race.62 While recognizing that
"[tlhe judgment of a state court determining or reviewing a child cus-
tody decision is not ordinarily a candidate for review by this Court,"'6 3
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous court, agreed to hear the
case because of the important federal concerns raised by the petitioner's
claim. 64 In granting certiorari, the Court did not even mention the do-
mestic relations exception. 65 Moreover, Palmore is not the first federal
question case involving domestic relations issues in which the Supreme
Court has exercised jurisdiction. 6 6 Thus, given the Supreme Court's sub
silentio determinations that the domestic relations exception is no bar to
the exercise of federal jurisdiction where a substantial federal question
has been raised, it seems likely that the court would uphold the grant of
jurisdiction in a case such as Flood where interpretation of a federal stat-
ute is at issue.
The Third Circuit's conclusion that the full faith and credit clause
does not preclude federal court jurisdiction over custody cases under
the PKPA is also sound. As Judge Adams noted, federal courts' reluc-
tance to assume jurisdiction to enforce custody decrees under the au-
thority of this constitutional provision stems from a fear of involvement
in the merits of the underlying custody dispute, which inquiry has tradi-
tionally been reserved for the state courts.6 7 This concern, however,
should not deter federal courts from hearing cases brought under the
PKPA because the Act, as compared with the full faith and credit
clause, 6 8 permits a federal court to enforce a decree without becoming
enmeshed in the underlying custody battle. 69
62. Id. at 1880.
63. Id. at 1881.
64. Id. For Justice Burger's statement on the reviewability of state court
custody determinations by the Supreme Court, see supra text accompanying note
63.
65. See 104 S. Ct. at 1881.
66. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Caban v. Moham-
med, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (§ 111 of New York Domestic Relations Law held
unconstitutional because it permitted unwed mother, but not unwed father, to
block adoption of their child simply by withholding her consent); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Virginia statute prohibiting interracial marriage held
unconstitutional). See generally Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the
Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1980) (although domestic relations is primarily a
matter of state law, federal courts may impose constitutional limits on state
powers).
67. For a discussion of the federal courts' reluctance to assume jurisdiction
in custody cases under the authority of the full faith and credit clause, see supra
note 44 and accompanying text. See also Wand, supra note 8, at 348-55.
68. For a discussion comparing the provisions of the PKPA with the full
faith and credit clause, see supra note 45.
69. See 727 F.2d at 310. Under the rules of the PKPA, if two states concur-
rently render custody decrees, one state has asserted jurisdiction in violation of
federal law. See id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a)-(g) (1982)). According to the
Third Circuit, "[ildentifying that errant state under [the PKPA] requires only
preliminary inquiry into jurisdictional facts." Id.
12
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Notwithstanding the basic soundness of the Flood court's analysis,
the opinion is not beyond criticism. The Third Circuit gave little weight
to the legislative analysis contained in Bennett v. Bennett,70 in which the
District of Columbia Circuit, albeit in dicta, reached a conclusion di-
rectly contrary to the Flood holding. 7 1 Although Bennett was brought in
diversity rather than under the PKPA,72 Judge Bazelon, writing for the
majority, nevertheless addressed the issue of whether the PKPA contem-
plates federal court interpretation and enforcement of its provisions.
73
After reviewing the legislative history of the PKPA and focusing upon
the traditional federal court deference to the "peculiar province, experi-
ence, and competence of the state courts" in domestic relations matters,
he concluded that Congress did not intend a federal court role.
7 4
In Flood, the Third Circuit failed squarely to address the District of
Columbia Circuit's determination that the legislative history of the
PKPA does not reflect a congressional intent that jurisdiction to enforce
compliance with the PKPA be exercised by federal courts. Instead, the
Third Circuit distinguished Bennett solely on the grounds that Bennett,
unlike Flood, involved a plaintiff that did not allege a federal issue under
the court's federal question jurisdiction, but rather asserted a claim in
diversity. 75 The Third Circuit's failure adequately to address the legisla-
tive analysis contained in Bennett is significant because it increases the
70. 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
71. See 727 F.2d at 312 n.27.
72. 682 F.2d at 1043-44. In Bennett, a father suing under diversity jurisdic-
tion sought two kinds of relief: damages for his ex-spouse's allegedly tortious
violation of a custody decree and injunctive relief from future tortious interfer-
ence in the custody decree. Id. at 1040. The court allowed the damages claim to
proceed, but denied jurisdiction over the claim for injunctive relief. Id. at 1042,
1044. The father asserted no claims under the PKPA. See id.
73. Id. at 1043.
74. Id. Judge Bazelon stated: "We note that conspicuously absent from
this comprehensive enactment is any provision creating or recognizing a direct
role for the federal courts in determining child custody. Indeed, the legislative
history of the Act makes clear that Congress deliberately and emphatically omit-
ted such a role." Id. In reaching this conclusion the Bennett Court relied on
testimony by Congressman Duncan and A. Miller, President of Children's
Rights, Inc., at the legislative hearings on the PKPA. Id. at 1043 n.6. See Joint
Hearing, supra note 52, at 20 (testimony of Congressman Duncan); id. at 71 (testi-
mony of A. Miller). The court in Flood and the court in Bennett cited the same
testimony and reached a different conclusion. The Third Circuit should have
addressed why its interpretation of such testimony, in support of its conclusion
that the federal courts have jurisdiction under the PKPA, was the correct one.
75. 727 F.2d at 312 n.27. The Flood court noted:
Bennett concluded that [the PKPA] did not legislatively alter the do-
mestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction so as to permit a fed-
eral court to issue the injunction requested by the plaintiff in that case.
We do not believe that such a reading of [the PKPA's] legislative his-
tory can be applied to a suit predicated on federal question jurisdiction
which seeks to enforce compliance with [the PKPA] itself.
1022 [Vol. 30: p. 1010
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likelihood that federal courts will interpret the PKPA inconsistently. For
example, in Siler v. Storey,7 6 a case decided after Flood, the district court
for the Northern District of Texas would not explicitly conclude that the
plaintiff could bring an action under the PKPA in federal court.7 7 How-
ever, the jurisdictional issue in Siler might have been decided differently
had the Third Circuit provided a more in-depth analysis to support its
own view and to distinguish Bennett.78
A related weakness of the Flood decision is evident in the Third Cir-
cuit's failure to reconcile fully its acknowledgement that the legislative
history of the PKPA "demonstrates that Congress intended custody de-
terminations to remain in the hands of the state courts," 79 with its deter-
mination that "in limited circumstances of non-compliance with [the
PKPA], federal district court intervention is permissible." 80 In attempt-
ing to justify its conclusion that the legislative history of the PKPA sup-
ports such federal intervention, the court was unable to point to any
language directly expressing an intent to provide for federal judicial re-
view for the enforcement of the Act.8 1 The Third Circuit instead relied
solely on statements in the Act's legislative history reflecting a grave
concern over the need to enact an effective, uniform national scheme of
custody jurisdiction to rectify the problem of child snatching. 82 The
76. 587 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
77. Id. at 987. The court stated: "The jurisdiction of this court [plaintiff]
apparently seeks.., is founded on [the PKPA]. That statute, however, nowhere
creates a federal judicial remedy for child custody matters." Id. (citations
omitted).
78. See id. The Siler court, after reviewing the Flood decision, stated:
Even if it be assumed, contrary to... Bennett v. Bennett above, that [the
PKPA] creates a federal judicial remedy for child custody matters, the
federal courts are not given exclusive jurisdiction to grant such a rem-
edy. This court is unwilling to assume, as [plaintiff] would have it do,
that the courts of Texas will not protect her federal rights.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
79. 727 F.2d at 310.
80. Id. at 312.
81. See Addemdum to Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 104 (letter from Patricia
M. Wald, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, to Congressman
Peter Rodino, Chairman, House Committee on theJudiciary). Ms. Wald stated:
"Nor does the legislation establish a federal substantive law-it would give the
district courts jurisdiction to enforce the custody orders of State Courts and the
law which will be applied is purely state law-and, accordingly, federal question
jurisdiction likewise may not lie." Id. (emphasis in original).
82. See 727 F.2d at 311 nn.24-26. See also Hearing, supra note 54;Joint Hear-
ing, supra note 52, at 15 (statement of Senator Malcolm Wallop, sponsor of the
PKPA); id. at 4 (statement of Senator Alan Cranston, co-sponsor of the PKPA);
id. at 20 (statement of Congressman Duncan). Senator Wallop stated: "While
the traditional role of State law must be preserved in intrastate cases, we at the
Federal level have a compelling responsibility to take the necessary and appro-
priate steps to assist states in resolving the complicated interstate and interna-
tional cases which they have been unable to adequately address themselves."
Joint Hearing, supra note 52, at 15 (statement of Senator Malcolm Wallop). At the
same hearing, Professor Russell Coombs of Rutgers-Camden Law School stated:
1985] 1023
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limited nature of the Third Circuit's analysis, again, increases the
chances that other federal and state courts may refuse to adopt its
conclusion.
Although the Third Circuit's legislative and legal analysis may be
criticized as above, the court nevertheless reached the proper result in
concluding that Congress intended to permit the enforcement of the
PKPA in federal court.8 3 It is contended that Congress' failure ex-
pressly to provide for federal court enforcement of the PKPA was the
result of an oversight, rather than an intended omission.8 4 Considering
the magnitude of the parental kidnapping problem8 5 and the terrible
track record the state courts have had in dealing with the problem, even
under the UCCJA,8 6 it is unlikely that Congress would have intentionally
created a scheme of federal standards to remedy the kidnapping prob-
lem without mandating some federal enforcement of those standards.
Nonetheless, Congress' failure to provide an explicit right of enforce-
ment under the statute does not preclude the existence of such a right.8 7
The availability of a federal enforcement mechanism is important be-
cause federal courts, not themselves involved in the merits of custody
determinations, are less likely to apply the PKPA in a biased fashion.8 8
"Enactment of this federal legislation is necessary ... to ensure that the funda-
mental, central provisions establishing the basic criteria of jurisdiction and the
duty of interstate enforcement are uniform among all the States." Id. at 143
(statement of Professor Russell Coombs).
83. Several courts have subsequently followed the holding in Flood. See
Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749 F.2d 1138, 1141 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[w]e agree with
the Braaten court" that Congress could not have intentionally rendered the
PKPA meaningless by so restricting the availability of a federal forum); McDou-
gald v. Jenson, 596 F. Supp. 680, 685 (N.D. Fla. 1984) (citing Flood as authority
for court's ability to assert jurisdiction under the PKPA).
84. Although the PKPA requires that a state must give deference to another
state's custody decree, no explicit provision exists for situations (such as the one
present in Flood) in which a state flatly refuses to follow the PKPA, and asserts
jurisdiction to modify another state's custody decree, giving no deference what-
soever. See Wand, supra note 8, at 389-90. Clearly, Congress gave little consid-
eration to the idea that the states would fail to comply with the provisions of the
PKPA. Several statements, like that of Professor Coombs, are evidence that
non-compliance was not thought to be a problem. Professor Coombs utilized
phrases such as "few cases [of non-compliance]" in his discussions. He stated
that "in the few cases where prevention and deterrence fail and child snatching
does occur, the parent locator service should be capable of locating most of the
parents that hide." Joint Hearing, supra note 52, at 136 (statement of Professor
Russell Coombs) (emphasis added).
85. For a discussion of the magnitude of the parental kidnapping problem,
see supra text accompanying note 3. See also supra note 2. See generally S.
ABRAHMS, supra note 1; M. AGOPIAN, supra note 1.
86. For a discussion of the ineffectiveness of the UCCJA, see supra notes 53-
54. See generally Sampson, What's Wrong With the UCCJA? Punitive Decrees and
Hometown Decisions are Making a Mockery of This Uniform Act, 3 FAM. ADVOC., Spring
1981, at 28.
87. See 727 F.2d at 312.
88. See Wand, supra note 8, at 388-91. Even after the enactment of the
15
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Congress' failure to provide explicitly for federal enforcement of
the PKPA has had the unfortunate result of leading to a further lack of
uniformity in the enforcement of the PKPA.89 At present, the judicial
pronouncements on the issue of whether federal courts have federal
question jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of the PKPA have
reached contrary results. 90 In the Third and Fifth Circuits, as a result of
the courts' holdings in Flood and Heartfield v. Heartfield,9 I a federal forum
is now available to those litigants who seek redress from conflicting cus-
tody decrees. 92 However, because of the decision in Bennett,9 3 a litigant
in the District of Columbia Circuit is most likely relegated to nonfederal
courts for adjudication of such child custody issues.9 4 Clearly such in-
consistent results were not contemplated by Congress.
Congress should act expeditiously to enact an explicit grant of fed-
eral jurisdiction and thereby clarify this uncertain situation. Such an
explicit grant would further uniformity among both federal courts seek-
ing to interpret the PKPA, and among state courts seeking to modify
custody decrees in accordance with the PKPA. In enacting such an ex-
plicit grant of jurisdiction, Congress should also address the question,
noted but not answered in Flood, of whether a plaintiff must exhaust
state remedies for the alleged noncompliance with the PKPA prior to
invoking federal review. 95 The PKPA legislative history makes it clear
that Congress rejected the idea of calling upon federal courts in the first
instance to enforce a state court's child custody decree.9 6 However,
Congress made no clear statement as to whether a plaintiff should be
required to raise in state court a claim that a second state was violating
PKPA, state courts have continued to exhibit their "propensity for hometown
decisions." See id. at 388 (quoting Sampson, supra note 84, at 30). For an exam-
ple of when state courts have failed to comply with the mandate of the PKPA and
have awarded custody to the litigant residing within their borders, see Flood, 727
F.2d at 306 (courts of New Jersey and North Dakota entered inconsistent cus-
tody decrees); McDougald v. Jenson, 596 F. Supp. 680, 680 (N.D. Fla. 1984)
(courts of Florida and Washington entered inconsistent custody decrees). See
also Rush v. Stansbury, 668 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex. 1984) (conflicting custody
decrees in Texas and Tennessee).
89. See Flood, 727 F.2d 303; Siler v. Storey, 567 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Tex.
1984). Cf. Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (dicta indicating
federal courts do not have jurisdiction to enforce PKPA). For a comparison of
the conclusions reached by the Flood, Siler, and Bennett courts, see supra notes 57-
58, 72-74 & 76-78 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 89.
91. 749 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1985).
92. See id. at 1141; 727 F.2d at 313. A federal forum is also available to
litigants in the Northern District of Florida. See McDougald v. Jenson, 596 F.
Supp. 680 (N.D. Fla. 1984).
93. 682 F.2d 1039, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
94. See id. For a discussion of the result in Bennett, see supra notes 72-74 and
accompanying text.
95. 727 F.2d at 312 n.28.
96. Id. at 310.
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the terms of the PKPA, before bringing that claim to a federal court. 97
In enacting a federal enforcement provision, Congress should con-
sider not only the benefit to children but also the various policy consid-
erations underlying and relating to the PKPA. For example, it should
consider the negative impact that the lack of a federal enforcement
mechanism has on women who generally have fewer resources with
which to litigate an interstate custody dispute. 98
However, in considering such policy concerns and the need to ad-
dress the exhaustion issue, Congress should not lose sight of the pri-
mary purpose of the PKPA-the promotion of uniform child custody
decisions. The failure of Congress to explicitly provide for federal court
enforcement of the PKPA was an oversight that should not have oc-
curred and that Congress should presently rectify. If Congress acts
swiftly and clearly to establish a federal forum to enforce the provisions
97. Although neither Flood, 727 F.2d at 312 n.28, nor Bennett, 682 F.2d at
1044, address exhaustion, both Heartfield, 749 F.2d at 1138 and McDougald v.
Jenson, 596 F. Supp. 680 (N.D. Fla. 1984), do. In Heartfield the court indicated
that at a minimum there must be a conflict between the courts of one state and
the courts of another state before jurisdiction under the PKPA can lie. 749 F.2d
at 1138 (court denied plaintiffs injunctive relief because no conflict yet existed).
In McDougald, Judge Vinson stated:
I find no requirement, either expressed or implied, that the parties ex-
haust any available state remedies through an appeal to the highest
available state court when, as here, the custody dispute has already led
to clearly conflicting orders entered by the two states, and it is unlikely
that appeals in both (or either of the) states would result in a resolution
that would be accepted as final in both states.
596 F. Supp. at 680-81 n.2.
98. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MONEY INCOME
OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1979 23 (Current Population
Reports: Series P-60, No. 129 1981) (median per capita income of divorced wo-
men was $4,152; median per capita income of divorced men was $7,886). For a
discussion of the extensive litigation that occurred in the interstate custody dis-
pute in Flood, see supra text accompanying notes 19-36.
Although the provisions of the PKPA generally make it more difficult for
parents to flee the jurisdiction with their children and thus discourage parental
kidnapping, the provisions may have a chilling effect in certain situations where
a parent's safety is at stake. Telephone interview with Maria Hollandsworth,
Legal Director, House of Ruth, Baltimore, Md. (Oct. 2, 1984). Some provisions
within the PKPA exist to protect the safety of children who flee abusive situa-
tions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(C)(ii)(1982). Yet there is no provision within
the Act to allow a battered woman to flee the original "forum" jurisdiction with
her children in order to escape her batterer and protect her safety. Thus, a bat-
tered woman is forced to make an impossible choice between her own safety and
meeting the requirements of the PKPA. The threat of child snatching is the
most prevalent and persuasive threat that batterers use to control their victims.
Telephone interview with Joan Kuriansky, Esq., Executive Director, Women
Against Abuse, Philadelphia, Pa. (Oct. 1, 1984); Telephone interview with Marla
Hollandsworth, supra.
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of the PKPA, it will have taken an important step toward remedying the
phenomenon of parental kidnapping.
Judith Riddle Kohler
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